





Featherstone, D. (2016) Contested spaces of hegemony: left alliances after the crisis. 
Soundings, 63, pp. 8-24. (doi:10.3898/136266216819377048) 
 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 


































Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Contested spaces of hegemony: left alliances after the crisis 
Dave Featherstone 
 
In what none of us could have anticipated would have been her last editorial in 
Soundings, in November 2015, Doreen Massey offered her reflections on austerity 
and the current conjuncture, arguing that although times may have been hard for the 
left and there had been recent defeats as well as victories: ‘even five years ago most of 
these European challenges to neoliberalism could not have been imagined. They can 
now. Maybe there is here the potential fracturing of the ideological and political 
hegemony of neoliberalism that seemed so absent in the immediate aftermath of the 
financial crisis’.1  The election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader was, for Doreen, 
an important sign that there was a potential fracturing of the ideological and political 
hegemony of neoliberalism, something that she had worked so hard to contribute to. 
She felt keenly the importance of providing political support to Corbyn and to his 
broader project, and also the need to position his election and leadership in a wider 
conjunctural analysis.  
 
Positioning Corbyn in this way is significant is important, given that there have been 
relatively few attempts to situate his leadership on these terms. Gary Younge’s Stuart 
Hall Memorial Lecture was one insightful attempt to think about Corbyn as part of 
broader left alternatives such as Podemos and Syriza. He described Jeremy Corbyn as 
‘the unlikely beneficiary of a moment in which a resurgent left, newly oriented 
towards electoral politics, has surprised itself with its ability to both challenge and 
even win’. He argued, however, that ‘what he’s not is the product of a movement that 
can sustain that challenge once it has been made’.2 Younge’s account is a helpful 
attempt to think about Corbyn’s rise to prominence in conjunctural terms, that is in 
relation to the broader political context and relations that define the current post-crisis 
moment.  
 
One of the issues that makes sustaining a concerted challenge to dominant political 
cultures much more challenging these days is the increasing geographical 
fragmentation of left and centre-left politics in the UK; and this article seeks to 
explore the implications this has for constructing progressive alliances and hegemonic 
politics. Coming out of discussions I had with Doreen when she was in Glasgow in 
December 2015 for a Soundings workshop, this article, which we had intended to co-
write, seeks to make a contribution through thinking about the relationship between 
attempts to fracture the dominant political hegemony and the reconfigured terrain of 
left/centre-left parties and movements across the UK. I discuss three key elements 
within this heterogeneity. Firstly, there is the geographical fragmentation of the UK 
lefts, with a growing challenge to the Labour Party’s ability to hegemonise centre-left 
politics. Secondly, there is the challenge of engaging with discourses around regional 
inequality, and in particular with the Conservatives’ attempt to develop a clear 
political narrative around this through their account of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’. 
Thirdly, there is the question of how we might envision and construct alliances which 
build across these divisions. I argue that, while the logic of spatial division poses a 
                                                 
1 Massey, D. ‘Exhilarating Times’ Soundings, 61, 2015, p. 12 
2 Younge, G. ‘It’s abundantly clear that the left can gain ground- but it cannot yet hold it’ Guardian, 
19th December, 2015.  
number of challenges to the left, there are also possibilities for forging a post-
neoliberal agenda. 
 
Thinking hegemony and geography  
Doreen’s political and geographical engagements were always animated by key 
political questions. She worried away at key problematics and challenges and was 
never content to fall back on left theoretical orthodoxies. Rather, she was always 
concerned to push at the limits of such approaches through applying them and 
thinking with them. One of the key ways in which she did this was to develop a 
compelling set of interventions in thinking about the relations between space, place 
and politics. These interventions were never concerned with thinking about geography 
as a kind of academic exercise: Doreen was concerned with understanding the ways in 
which struggles over geography were integral to the making of particular kinds of 
political strategies and identities. Further, she saw thinking geographically as 
providing indispensable tools for thinking about politics. Here I seek to build on her 
insights and approach to engage with the political questions posed by the current 
conjuncture, and the possibilities for alternatives.  
 
Central to Doreen’s contribution to our understandings of politics was the sense that 
geographical differentiation always involved ‘more than some result of the spatial 
distribution of national phenomena’. Instead she positioned it as an always ‘active 
element in the troubled production of … national changes’.3 Throughout the late 
1970s and 1980s she gave an important sense of how regional divisions and 
antagonisms were foundational to the emergence of Thatcherism’s class project. This 
argument was central to her book Spatial Divisions of Labour, where she analysed the 
contested geographies of deindustrialisation.  
 
Doreen showed that uneven geographies were produced through political choices and 
engagements rather than being in some way inevitable. She was critical of attempts to 
naturalise regional inequality and to think about such issues in isolation from broader 
processes and relations. The recent refusal of the Conservatives to offer the kind of 
subsidies to the steel industry that they offered the banks, for example, is not just 
about privileging particular sectors of the economy: it is also about intensifying 
inequalities between different parts of the UK. The consequence will be that already 
depressed regions like South Wales, the North East and the Central Belt of Scotland 
are likely to be subjected to further job losses and the increased casualisation of work. 
And this Conservative refusal is also an intervention into the terms on which the 
regions of the UK are differentially integrated into globalised economic and political 
relations and circuits - and prioritises the interests of specific regions in relation to 
them.  
 
But Doreen was not interested in simply understanding the processes that shaped 
uneven development and regional inequality: she was committed to challenging them. 
And she did so through innovative political strategies and thinking, for example in her 
involvement with projects like ‘restructuring for labour’.4 Such alternative political 
imaginations came out of her own political activity. For example, her involvement in 
                                                 
3 Massey, D. World City Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007, 79. 
4 See World City, p. 84.  
the alliance of the new urban left with the miners during the 1984-5 strike, through the 
support group movement, which brought together groups that differed socially and 
politically as well as geographically, deepened her appreciation of the productive 
character of alliances and solidarities. In this regard, as she and Hilary Wainwright 
argued at the time, the support group movements showed that ‘industrial action’ and 
‘new social movements’ could be mutually dependent rather than antagonistic.5 They 
argued that the miners’ strike showed that some of the old institutions could be 
superseded and challenged without the abandonment of class politics’ (p168). Indeed 
Doreen argued that such a politics of solidarity could renew and reconfigure class 
relations and politics.  
 
Her work in this regard was influenced by her involvement with the Hegemony 
discussion group in the early 1980s, with Stuart Hall, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto 
Laclau. The group met to discuss new writing about hegemony, and its potentialities 
for refigured left strategies, and these political exchanges and conversations were part 
of the shared terrain that led to the formation of Soundings in the mid-1990s.7 
Gramsci was a central figure for the group, and it is interesting to note in this context 
that a key aspect of Gramsci’s originality was the way he positioned regional 
inequality as the product of political decisions and strategies, not just as something 
that is a ‘natural’ outcome.  
 
Gramsci foregrounded questions of geography and uneven development, and was 
adamant that it was necessary to locate political formations and strategies in their 
particular geographical contexts. He saw such geographies as constitutive of political 
identities and solidarities, not as a passive backdrop to left struggles. His fine essay 
Aspects of the Southern Question, for example, develops a clear analysis of the 
challenges to constructing a hegemonic bloc presented by the uneven fissures between 
Southern and Northern Italy; these made it much more difficult to create alliances 
between peasant struggles in the South and workers’ factory occupations in the north.8 
This notion of contested spatial relations within Gramsci’s account of hegemony is 
often overlooked. 
 
One of Doreen’s important contributions was to address much more systematically 
the implications of contested and uneven geographies for the construction of 
solidarities and alliances. A key way in which she did so was to think about the ways 
in which places are articulated and re-articulated through politics. She was attentive to 
political struggles over the terms through which places are produced, and about what 
they ‘stand for’, as well as the terms on which they are linked to other places. 
Through this attentiveness she articulated an understanding of the politics of 
conjuncture which was sensitive to the dynamics of particular places. She also 
emphasised that places could be important in producing/rearticulating conjunctural 
                                                 
5 Massey, D. and Wainwright, H. ‘Beyond the Coalfields: the Work of the Miners’ Support Groups’ in 
Beynon, H. (ed) Digging Deeper London: Verso, 149-168, emphasis in original 
7 See the discussion in ‘Stories So Far: A Conversation with Doreen Massey’ in Featherstone, D. and 
Painter, J. Spatial Politics: Essays for Doreen Massey Wiley, 253-266, p. 258.  
8 Gramsci, A. Selected Political Writings, 1921--1926 London, Lawrence and Wishart,  
forces in different ways, for example drawing attention to London’s role in shaping 
(but also contesting) the emergence of neoliberalism. 
 
This approach raises important questions about, and offers useful insights into, the 
ways in which we make sense of current UK left politics. It helps us identify what is 
at stake in the post-crisis conjuncture, and the nature of the broader connections that 
shape this political moment. It clarifies that struggles over the regions and constituent 
parts of the UK are an important part of attempts to fashion hegemonic narratives and 
positions: they are not - as they have all too often been regarded - a side show that can 
be ignored by the left.  
 
The Northern Powerhouse and hegemonic struggle 
Ken Spours has argued that the Conservatives’ hegemonic project has become clearer 
since their 2015 victory: in spite of their small majority, they are in the process of 
consolidating their grip on the English political landscape. ‘The party … is dominant 
in English politics outside the largest urban centres, and aims to consolidate its 
position in the South West and to move into the “Northern Powerhouse”’. He 
concludes that Osborne’s ambition is to ‘irreversibly detach the skilled working 
classes from allegiance to the Labour Party to make them part of a new Conservative 
political bloc’.9  
 
Michael Rustin has observed that this analysis shares with mainstream Labour a 
preoccupation with electoral allegiances and prospects. Pointing to the limitations of 
such an approach as a way of viewing the political scene, he insists that there is an 
important difference between pursuing a hegemonic strategy in order to create a new 
dominant social bloc and aiming to secure a majority in Parliament.10  
 
The limited geographical reach of the Conservative Party in both discursive and 
electoral terms has more significant implications than Spours suggests. As he notes, 
the Conservatives continue to have a marginal presence in Northern cities, even 
though they are beginning to regain a presence in Wales, and have now, rather 
unbelievably, become the official opposition in Scotland. And their policies seem to 
be designed to conjure a majority from whatever tools are to hand at a given time and 
place, rather than to construct a strategic vision. Zac Goldsmith’s London mayoral 
campaign seemed to indicate a focus on trying to create specific electoral blocs, if 
necessary in vicious, divisive and racialised ways, rather than in any sense being 
indicative of a political aspiration to shape a broader political vision. (And it also 
further undermined the impression that Cameron has any real desire to create a 
refigured party that is at ease with the multi-ethnic constituencies of the UK’s bigger 
cities.)  
 
In this regard the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ is perhaps better thought of as a clear sign 
that the Conservatives, especially George Osborne, are trying to think about how to 
regain support in the North. This is not to be confused with a strategy that has any 
hegemonic aspiration. It certainly has not had any serious impact on reviving Toryism 
in urban areas in the north, as testified to by the use of terms such as ‘Northern poor 
                                                 
9 The Osborne Supremacy’, Ken Spours, Renewal 24.1 2016, p15.  
10 Rustin, M. How Should We Read the Present Tory Moment? Soundings blog, 2016. 
house’, or by the Conservative candidate coming sixth in the 2016 Liverpool Mayoral 
election (with 3.6 per cent of the vote). The strategy also has differentiated traction 
and impact within the north: is is strongly associated with particular cities, notably 
Manchester and Leeds, that are already relatively well positioned in economic terms, 
and thus has the potential to deepen intra-regional inequalities in pernicious ways.  
 
A key challenge for any hegemonic project is to shape common sense in ways which 
are effective in achieving more than a surface or strategic buy-in. In this context, 
while there have been some insightful critiques of the Powerhouse strategy from left 
figures and movements, the lack of a convincing alternative narrative is a matter for 
concern, as Craig Berry has noted.11 In the same article he also notes that the gap 
between local Labour leaders in the north and the central party ‘has grown into a 
chasm in recent months’.  
 
One source of this problem has been a failure to critique the broader terms of debate 
which shape the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ project. In particular there was been little 
challenge to what Doreen identified as the ‘hegemonising effect’ of the discourse in 
which London figures as a national ‘golden goose’, whose growth should be 
supported above all else. As she argued, the effect of this narrative can be detected ‘in 
the fact that even those arguing the case for northern cities seem on occasions 
constrained to follow the line’.12 Some elements within Labour, most notably some 
city leaders, have bought in to this broader set of discourses, and this has undermined 
the ground on which Northern powerhouse can be challenged. Thus Joe Anderson, 
leader of Liverpool council, has argued that: ‘It’s a sad reflection on the Labour party 
that we’re having to do business with a Tory government who are cutting and 
bludgeoning us on the one hand, but at least they’re moving in a pragmatic way to 
devolve power.’ Andrew Adonis has a very similar analysis. His report on the 
economy for the 2014 Labour policy review frames questions of regional growth in 
relation to a lack of competitiveness and a productivity/skills gap. This makes it more 
difficult to articulate an alternative set of more equal and progressive regional 
alternatives.  
 
While it may have had limited impact on the Conservatives’ electoral fortunes in 
Northern cities, the Northern Powerhouse nonetheless offers a powerful discursive 
framing of questions around regional inequality and ‘the North’, which may yet shape 
political debate in significant ways. The necessity of posing a dynamic alternative 
account is all the more important given that there is a notable lack of active 
participation and identification among Labour supporters in key northern cities, which 
leaves them vulnerable to UKIP. In this regard, while the particular context of 
Scotland post-referendum is unique, some of the underlying tensions that have led to 
the dramatic loss of support for Labour in the Central Belt are not, and it is important 
to recognise this. 
 
Thus the Liverpool Labour Councillor Steve Munby has recently argued of the 
support base of Militant in the city in the 1980s:  
                                                 
11 Berry, C. ‘ ‘ Red Pepper 2016: 25 
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 There was a wave of working-class people in their 30s, 40s and 50s who lost 
their jobs from the decimation of unskilled manual occupations. They’d be in 
their 50s, 60s or 70s now. Militant particularly appealed to that layer of 
people. They’d been left high and dry and we haven’t really known what to do 
to help them- I mean they’re stuffed. Capital of Culture didn’t help them, or 
they’ve just ended up on the long term sick … there is a generation of really 
funny, literate, interesting people in Liverpool who were left high and dry by 
Thatcherism, and they matter.13  
 
Addressing the needs of such constituencies remains a problem for Labour - across 
the North and elsewhere. 
 
Such discontent is increasingly susceptible to being channelled and politically 
articulated towards the populist right. Thus Geoff Eley has argued that disaffection 
resulting from ‘the underlying disorder of societal dislocation associated with 
contemporary economic change’ has been racialised. The right gains traction because 
these changes produce ‘exactly the multifarious anxieties about boundaries whose 
interconnectedness xenophobia then readily cements’.14 This underlines the need to 
articulate alternative political antagonisms from those currently being mobilised to 
shape the political moment in exclusionary and chauvinistic ways. A key way to do 
this is through challenging the dogma that the unfettered market is the only way that 
societies can be effectively run.  
 
There are significant alternatives to draw on here, some of which have come out of 
local struggles against privatisation and outsourcing, including the community and 
union alliances forged against privatisation in Newcastle Council in 1999-2000, when 
the Unison branch in the Council led an innovative campaign to challenge outsourcing 
and create more dynamic public service. As Hilary Wainwright put it, they sought to 
challenge the culture of the council: ‘the way some of the services were managed 
began to be more dynamically public; the involvement of all levels of staff became 
more openly valued; and it began to create a positive relationship with service users 
and local communities’.15 This led to ‘a democracy-driven process of public service 
reform’, which became a model for resisting privatisation, and demonstrated a 
feasible alternative.16 This and similar struggles were among the alternatives 
discussed at the Porto Alegre World Social Forum, helping to create a stronger sense 
of the possibility of alternatives to the neoliberal world order. 
 
                                                 
13 Munby cited by Frost, D. and North, P. Militant Liverpool: A City on the Edge, 
Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2013: 206. 
14 Eley, G. ‘Fascism Then and Now’ Socialist Register 2016, 91-117, quote on p. 111. 
15 Wainwright, H. Reclaim the State: Experiments in Popular Democracy London: Verso, 2003.  
16 Wainwright, H. ‘Place Beyond Place and the Politics of ‘Empowerment’’ in Featherstone, D.J. and 
Painter, J. Spatial Politics: Essays for Doreen Massey Wiley, 2013, 235-252, p. 238-239. 
 
There are also other experiments that have potential. In a recent issue of Soundings 
Steve Munby made a useful contribution in outlining the ways in which Northern 
councils are currently already trying to do things differently, partly through breaking 
the dogma that privatisation works best. While some have argued that Munby is too 
accepting about working within the cost-cutting logics that have been contested by 
anti-austerity movements, his account of what effectively is the ‘remunicipalisation’ 
of waste collection in Liverpool shows that, paradoxically, challenging privatisation 
as a dogma can both save money and create more flexible, responsive and popular 
services.17  He notes that, instead of ‘relationships dominated by contracts, which 
promote centralisation and rigidity’,  Liverpool councillors have promoted 
relationships ‘at ward level, involving residents, councillors and the bin crews’. This 
has provided ‘a better and more flexible service, at less cost’.18 Other initiatives 
include the Preston Co-operative Initiative, which has committed the council to 
supporting an alternative approach to economic development. 
 
These actually existing alternatives to market-led regional growth offer significant 
possibilities. They have more potential than a simple anti-austerity agenda when it 
comes to opening up a political space for a dynamic and more equal regional strategy. 
Anti-austerity rhetoric often seems to operate within a hegemonic terrain defined by 
the right. As Craig Berry argues, Corbyn’s strategy to convince the electorate of the 
‘macro-economic erroneousness and ethical callousness’ of the austerity agenda will 
probably do little to dent the ideological hegemony of the neoliberal ideas that 
underpin austerity. This is because few people actually welcome austerity: ‘the 
government’s ingenuity lies in the co-evolution of austerity with a set of political 
objectives, such as greater local autonomy, that the electorate is more likely to 
support’.19  
 
Devolution and asymmetries of power 
Devolution has added a further dimension to discussions of regional political 
difference. It has opened up political spaces and discourses that pose a real challenge 
to austerity narratives. In Scotland in particular, austerity has become central to the 
mobilisation of alternative ways of thinking about politics. Indeed the SNP’s 
positioning of itself as an ‘anti-austerity’ party has been one of the ways in which it 
has so effectively hegemonised (centre left!) politics in Scotland. It has made anti-
austerity politics and movements for independence synonymous. But it has in part 
been gifted this ground. And, as Gerry Mooney notes elsewhere in this issue (px), its 
position has only limited substance: the party has managed to combine a rhetorical 
commitment to anti-austerity politics with stealth austerity measures, as, for example, 
in their Council Tax freeze. This is certainly not a politics that brings the broader 
neoliberal project into political contestation. The 2016 SNP election campaign was 
                                                 
17 See Blamire, J. ‘Exploring the Potentiality of Anti-Austerity Resistance in the UK Context: 
Observations from Liverpool’ http://joshblamire.weebly.com/resources.html. 
 
18 Munby, S. ‘Miracles Can Happen…’ Soundings 61, 2015, p.45 
19 Berry, C. ‘Balancing Britain’ Red Pepper, February – March, 2016: 22-25. 
full of centrist and cautious pronouncements: thus, for instance, they drew back from 
advocating a tax increase for top earners.  
 
In seeking to understand the implications of a more heterogeneous politics for the 
post-crisis conjuncture it is helpful to position it within a longer unfolding of the 
spatial politics of devolution and its consequences. As Danny Mackinnon has argued, 
UK devolution is a ‘process rather than an event’, and that the asymmetries between 
England and the ‘Celtic fringe’ - Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – have 
become more pronounced over time.20 A key problem here is that Labour Party 
strategy, at least centrally, has not grasped this processual nature of devolution. They 
have tended to see it as a one-off change that would have the double effect of seeing 
off the challenge of insurgent ‘nationalists’ while simultaneously - at least in Scotland 
and Wales - delivering parliaments and assemblies where Labour would have a built-
in, and perpetual, dominance.  
 
It should be noted, though, that the devolution process has been negotiated in different 
ways in different nations. In Wales, Rhodri Morgan’s ‘Clear Red Water Strategy’, 
which explicitly put distance between Welsh Labour and Blairism, was part of a much 
more dynamic response to devolution than that of Scottish Labour.21 This showed the 
possibilities that devolution could open up for creative political strategies and 
projects, but also the necessity of actively constructing a distinctive political project in 
devolved contexts. This is partly what has enabled Labour in Wales to retain a sense 
of political momentum and narrative – something that Labour in Scotland would 
appear to have lost for the foreseeable future. 
  
The asymmetries which Mackinnon notes have not just divided the left in different 
parts of the UK: they have also been part of the dissolution of one of the main ways in 
which the post-war consensus was framed within the Labour Party. As Satnam Virdee 
has argued, this was based on the assumption that, over time, socialist nationalist 
struggles for social justice and democratisation, and their eventual ‘ideological 
incorporation’ into the nation, would be mediated by the Labour Party and the trade 
union movement.22 In this regard there is a relation between the politics of de-
industrialisation and the rupturing of the post-war social settlement.  
 
Devolution has also offered important possibilities for the left however: Scotland and 
Wales have retained a more social democratic approach, ‘resisting market-oriented 
reforms and emphasising professional values, public health, planning and service 
integration’.23 Furthermore, the representation of greens and socialists in Scotland has 
already put new issues onto the political agenda, and the new Scottish Green MSPs - 
such as the radical land rights campaigner Andy Wightman - are likely to carry on 
                                                 
20 Mackinnon, D. ‘Devolution, State Restructuring and Policy Divergence in the UK’ Geographical 
Journal 181: 1, 201, 47-56, 47. 
21 Davies, N. and Williams, D. Clear Red Water: Devolution and Socialist Politics London: Francis Boutle 
Publishers, 2009, 
22 Virdee, S Class, Racism and the Racialised Outsider Palgrave, Macmillan, 2014, 5. 
23 Mackinnon, 52. 
with this.24 The election of two People Before Profit AMs in Derry and West Belfast 
is also significant. There have also been attempts to forge alternatives within the 
devolved nations, especially for some of the de-industrialised regions at the sharp end 
of neoliberal restructuring. Thus Plaid Cymru’s Greenprint for the Valleys represents 
a useful attempt to think about an alternative environment and economic strategy for 
regional development. This is particularly significant in a context of proposed steel 
plant closures and struggles against open-cast mining.26 
 
The response to all this from the two main Westminster parties has been instructive. 
Left gains in devolved nations have frequently been articulated as unfair by the 
political right in UK. Westminster Labour, meanwhile, has often remained aloof from 
such gains, rather than promoting them as exemplars of what a more ambitious UK 
Labour government could achieve. In this regard the right, while gaining limited 
traction and presence in either the Welsh assembly or the Scottish parliament, has 
been able to use devolution in a strategic fashion. In the 2015 Westminster election 
debates the Tories sought to intensify the differences between the centre-left parties, 
and between different parts of the UK, and benefited from exploiting these divisions 
while simultaneously playing on fears that a Labour government would be in the 
SNP’s pocket. This became a crucial part of the political narrative of the election.  
 
These developments show the importance of fostering a political culture of exchange 
and alliance, rather than division, between different left/centre-left parties. There are 
also real resonances between the ruptural moment represented by the independence 
movement in Scotland and the desire for change that crystallised around Corbyn’s 
election to the Labour leadership. The political spaces these movements have opened 
up have the potential to be significant. This suggests the possibility - if different 
conceptions of politics could be intensified/aligned - of shaping a new challenge to 
the existing neoliberal hegemony of UK politics, of constructing something that might 
look like a post-neoliberal consensus. Both in Scotland and in the Labour Party there 
has been a significant re-engagement with political processes and parties: the SNP and 
Greens dramatically increased their membership after the referendum, as did the 
Labour Party after Corbyn’s election.  
 
These commonalities represent a significant possibility, but their geographical 
fragmentation cautions against any sense that they could be easily united in to a 
‘national popular’ strategy as of old. In this sense  there are lessons to be learned from 
the failure of Ed Miliband’s One Nation Labour strategy within this more pluralised 
terrain. Equally, though - and contra to suggestions by Corbyn and McDonnell - there 
is little sense that an appeal to class loyalties could transcend such divided 
geographies, not least because this misses the extent to which identifications of class 
and nation are interwoven. This poses the question of how a broader hegemonic 
politics might be fashioned that connects and articulates different sites and places, and 
different political parties and traditions on the left, without linking them to a singular 
national project. Thinking through what terrain might be shaped here is central to 
thinking about the future of left politics in the UK.  
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Elements of an alternative hegemony 
The Corbyn project has often been posed as a ‘return’ to a more ‘authentic’ version of 
the Labour Party. There are, however, many dangers associated with this narrative, 
not least that of romanticising what the Labour Party has actually been in the past. 
There is clearly still a need for a ‘modernising’ project - albeit one that is very 
different from the version advocated by New Labour. There is a need for a 
modernisation that engages with questions raised by changes in society and economy, 
and by feminism and anti-racist politics, but also finds different ways of relating to 
other left parties, movements and constituencies. This further underlines the 
importance of constructing a hegemonic left project for the UK in the wake of the 
crisis.  
  
This is not a question of finding fixed positions that transcend context. Engaging with 
hegemonic politics is always about constructing the political field and alliances in the 
here and now. What is crucial is how the left articulates particular issues - housing, 
environmental politics, Trident - as part of a broader approach and narrative in 
relation to a post-crisis context. As Stuart Hall argued in relation to Thatcherism and 
popular conceptions of politics, ‘“strategy” cannot be a matter of ideological politics 
alone. It is also a question of how to construct around those conceptions a popular 
politics or, to put it more simply, the difficult business of constructing alliances’.27 
This is about much more than recognising that in tactical terms Labour and the SNP 
are likely to need to develop some kind of alliance, or at least rapprochement, in order 
to defeat the Tories. Rather, it addresses the issue of what popular conceptions of 
politics different constituencies on the left of UK politics might bring into play, and 
how they might be articulated to forge elements of a post-neoliberal consensus, 
especially now that even the IMF are beginning to critique neoliberalism and to argue 
that austerity doesn’t work.  
  
It is also perhaps obvious, but nonetheless really important, to emphasise that the 
SNP, Plaid, the Greens and Labour are operating on broadly similar 
intellectual/political terrain. What unites them politically is far more significant than 
political differences, especially in relation to the Tories. Shifting political discourses 
open up possibilities for developing new ways of articulating popular resentments 
about neoliberalism’s imposition of austerity on the majority while enriching a 
revanchist few. This has the potential to shape alternative ‘popular conceptions of 
politics’ in ways which speak across straightforward left/right constituencies.  
 
While the legacy of Labourism is still a major problem for attempts to think about left 
alliances and convergences, there are possibilities that need to be nurtured. There are 
hopeful signs, for example, that the SNP, Plaid, Greens and Labour might find 
common cause around key issues such as opposing the Trade Union Bill, in ways 
which may have significant effects. There are also possibilities opened up by the 
depth of Corbyn’s roots in diverse social and political movements. The paradox that 
he has deeper recognition from these movements than many of his own MPs offers a 
historic opportunity to shift some of the long standing dynamics of Labour’s aloofness 
from various struggles and place-based politics. There is the potential here to redraw 
the terms on which Labour engages with ‘community’ politics and other struggles. 
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A key example here is the way in which tax has emerged as central to the terms of 
political debate, in ways which would have seemed impossible in the period 
associated with New Labour and its intense relaxedness about the rich. This indicates 
the potential for a more collective and fair politics to be shaped through debates 
around tax, and through harnessing the anger and resentment around large scale tax-
avoidance. These debates also suggest the potential strength of campaigns in which 
different elements of the left work together, or at least in relation to each other: the 
direct action movement UK Uncut has been central to making tax and tax avoidance 
central to political debate and agendas, as have campaigns by unions such as the PCS 
(Though it has to be said that, while tax avoidance itself has been politicised, there is 
still reluctance among mainstream politicians to propose tax rises. Kezia Dugdale lost 
badly on such a platform in Scotland, while Sturgeon retreated over re-introducing the 
50% high tax rate.) There is the potential here for developing a politics based on 
mobilising a widespread and intensifying sense of unfairness in the wake of the crisis. 
And, in Doreen Massey’s terms, there is an opportunity to make a decisive challenge 
to what the UK stands for internationally: to reject its role as a hub for a networked 
set of offshore tax havens and instead choose to play a more progressive and equitable 
role.  
 
This renewed emphasis on tax as a collective good also offers possibilities for 
thinking again about the role of the public sector and forms of public ownership. This 
is an area where there are interesting convergences emerging: the SNP, Plaid, Labour 
and Greens all support developing public/community ownership in significant ways. 
Thus Plaid, Labour and the Greens all support bringing railways back into public 
ownership, while the SNP has advocated community ownership of land. Patrick 
Harvie of the Scottish Greens scored a notable success in the recent Scottish Leaders’ 
debate when he attacked the toxic legacy of PFI in Scotland’s jerry-built schools.28 
This is a further illustration of the shifting terms of debate and the political 
opportunities this can open up. Public ownership is also an area where there are a 
number of ongoing social movement and/or union-led struggles, for example the 
campaign of the RMT to keep the ferry service Calmac in the public sector. And it is 
certainly not just the left Labour ‘usual suspects’ who are making such cases. Tristram 
Hunt’s recent speech revisiting traditions of municipal socialism suggested potentially 
broader support for questioning of neoliberalism ownership models, and posed 
interesting questions about how they relate to different articulations of localism.  
 
As Andy Cumbers has argued, there is currently a definite potential for reconfiguring 
ways of thinking about public ownership, and going beyond the binary opposition 
between neoliberal private ownership and top-down state public ownership, and there 
are important connections here with green/climate politics: the remunicipalisation of 
energy provision has become an important terrain of struggle and of the forging of 
alternative social and environmental relations, particularly in German cities such as 
Hamburg and Berlin. There are also possibilities for creating new forms of ownership 
for emerging renewable energy sectors such as wind and tidal energy, and these have 
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the potential to shape different social relations rather than to simply reproduce 
neoliberal ones.  
 
The state of debate around environmental politics also underlines the failure of the 
Tory modernising project, and the Conservatives’ evacuation of this ground. And the 
resurgence (or maybe changing same) of Tory racism in Zac Goldsmith’s mayoral 
campaign - a further retreat from Tory detoxification - highlights the importance of 
challenging divisive rhetoric around migration. These are both areas where lines of 
antagonism can be drawn between the Conservatives/UKIP and the different 
left/centre-left parties.  
 
In the case of immigration there is an important opportunity to engage with a positive 
articulation of ordinary multiculturalism. As Stuart Hall argued, ‘race’ can function as 
a ‘lens through which people come to perceive that a crisis is developing’; it can be 
‘the framework through which the crisis is experienced’.29 In this regard, it is 
important to move beyond Labour’s passive role in these debates. While it is clear 
that there are concerns around migration among some sections of the working class 
and other voters, this is hardly surprising given the centrality of these questions to 
mainstream media and political discourse.  
 
A key challenge here has to be to attempt to shift the terms of debate in this regard, 
rather than to merely act as an echo chamber for such views. Cruddas et al in their 
report on the 2015 election may not be entirely wrong when they argue that Labour ‘is 
perceived by voters as a party that supports an ‘open door’ approach to immigration, 
lacks credibility on the economy, and is a ‘soft touch’ on welfare spending.’ But there 
are key implications for what political narrative you develop to deal with this situation 
rather than just to accept this characterisation and the values that underpin it. As 
Doreen argued ‘Labour does not put in that effort to create shifts in people’s hearts 
and minds. It just listens to focus groups. It doesn’t itself go out and try and create a 
new common sense, a new narrative’.30  
 
One aspect of a new narrative here is the importance of making connections here with 
the ways in which austerity has had key racialized/ gendered/ classed impacts.31 The 
challenge here in terms of hegemonic politics is to articulate a challenge to and go 
beyond the racialized, gendered and classed divisions that neoliberal strategies and 
precarious working practices thrive on and intensify.32 As Tim Roche of the GMB has 
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recently argued there is a pressing need, particularly in the context of the harsh anti-
immigrant rhetoric of the EU referendum debates, to be more pro-active in offering an 
alternative narrative. There are potential constituencies to be shaped and articulated 
here which can reach beyond traditional left union and party structures which have 
not tended to engage effectively with the struggles and grievances of precarious 
workers. This is important as potential constituencies to be brought into and potential 
to engage with left political project in important ways.  
 
It is clearly difficult to construct hegemonic positions when your primary concern is 
with ‘hanging on’. In that sense of a change in ‘style’ of politics in certain ways 
which might be more aligned with sense of radical democratic left politics through 
shaping different alliances has potential. It also has the potential to engage with and 
intensify some of the shifting terms of political discourses to shape elements of a post-
neoliberal political agenda.  
 
